



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Professor Ziegler uses the terms "happiness" and "welfare" as interchangeable, giving at one time "the greatest happiness principle," and at another "the greatest possible welfare of the greatest possible number," as the standard and end. It is throughout apparent—as the above definition of "the good" would imply—that for Professor Ziegler society is an "aggregate of individuals." It is therefore somewhat startling to find him announcing, "there is for the individual no *summum bonum*, no supreme good." One wonders how, where, or in what it is to be realized! The radical defect, indeed, of our English utilitarian writers seems to attach to Professor Ziegler's thought. In spite of his German birth, in spite of at least some acquaintanceship with Kant and Hegel, in spite of denouncing the "narrow individualism" of Hobbes, Professor Ziegler remains first and last individualist. He never really transcends the antithesis he sets himself to explain. He speaks on almost the last page of his book of "that inward self-contradiction which we have already recognized in the idea of the Supreme Good,—it is that continual opposition between the individual and the whole, between morality and happiness,—an opposition which no *Deus ex machinâ*, no hereafter, has the power ever to reconcile or banish from the world."

His psychology has everywhere the same defect. "Man is an egotist by nature;" "I must first myself become a personality in order to be able to do something for others;" "Duty and virtue are peculiarly ideas of an individualistic ethic."

In spite of these serious defects, the book is characterized throughout by a social enthusiasm, and by the habit of taking in all matters of practice the social point of view. But to praise it in this respect is to reduce it to the position of a hand-book of morals, whereas it aims at being a hand-book of the science of ethics. The book contains much that is admirable, but nowhere the *rationale* of its most admirable conclusions.

M. S. GILLILAND.

SOCIAL STATICS, abridged and revised; together with THE MAN *versus* THE STATE. By Herbert Spencer. Fourth thousand and twelfth thousand respectively. London: Williams & Norgate, 1892.

This volume, together with the recently published treatise on "Justice," and the "Plea for Liberty," edited by Mr. Mackay, may fairly be regarded as containing the complete gospel of individualism as conceived by the Spencerian school. The articles of this gospel are so well known and have been so freely discussed that it would be out of place to attempt any criticism of them here. To bestow praise on a writer of Mr. Spencer's world-wide renown would be still more impertinent. It must suffice to indicate what are the main points in which the present combined edition differs from preceding ones.

In the case of "The Man *versus* the State," there is scarcely any alteration. The only important change is to be found in the essay on *The Sins of Legislators*, in which a note is added (p. 341) illustrating from the recent municipal history of Glasgow the terrible disasters that result from "socialistic meddling."

"Social Statics," on the other hand, is reduced to about half its former size. This condensation is effected partly by the omission of diffuse illustrations and truistic propositions. Thus, no reader is likely to regret the disappearance of

the profound remarks that "restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the violent ; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent. . . . Were there no thieves and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary." If this is philosophy, the writings of Martin Tupper were probably poetry. Partly, again, the condensation is effected by omitting discussions which have been more fully developed in the treatise on "Justice." Such omissions also need not be regretted. But another large section of omissions consists of passages with which Mr. Spencer is no longer in agreement. It is to these that we must specially devote our attention. If this edition were intended entirely to supersede the earlier one, it would be a matter for regret that so much of Mr. Spencer's earlier methods of thought should be lost ; but the two editions, taken together, furnish material for an interesting biographical study.

The first thing that strikes us is the completeness with which the earlier theological conceptions are swept away. We hear no more about "the Divine Idea, and the conditions of its realization." We are no longer informed that "there are few, if any, amongst civilized people who do not agree that human well-being is in accordance with the Divine will. The doctrine is taught by all our religious teachers ; it is assumed by every writer on morality ; we may therefore safely consider it as an admitted truth." Nor are we treated any longer to such gems of reasoning as the following : "The denial of rights amounts to a libel on the Deity. For . . . that which a man has a right to is that which God intended for him. And to say that man has no right to freedom of action, is to say that God did not mean him to have it. Without freedom of action, however, man cannot fulfil his desires. Then God willed that he should not fulfil them. But the non-fulfilment of the desires produces misery. Therefore God intended that he should be miserable. By which absurdity we may safely consider the position disproved." Mr. Spencer has evidently advanced from the theological to the metaphysical stage. As for the *positive* stage, he was always at that ! One cannot help wondering, however, whether Mr. Spencer's individualism is not a relic of his theological stage, which he has never fully reconsidered in the light of his new position. What is his argument for freedom ? "God wills human happiness ; that happiness is attainable only through the medium of faculties ; for the production of happiness those faculties must be exercised ; the exercise of them presupposes liberty of action : these are the steps by which we find our way from the Divine will to the law of equal freedom." *Voilà tout.* Mr. Spencer now omits this argument. But has he anything as cogent to offer from the point of view of evolutionary agnosticism ? Or, again, "It is said of a certain personage that he wished he had been consulted when the world was being made, for that he could have given good advice ; and not a little historical celebrity has attached to this personage in virtue of his so-thought unparalleled arrogance. Shallow, shallow ! Why, the great majority of our statesmen and politicians do as much every day. Advice, indeed ! they do not stop at advice. They actively interpose, take into their own hands matters that God seems to be mismanaging, and undertake to set them right ! It is clear to them that social wants and relationships have been so carelessly provided for that without their vigilant management all will go wrong. As for any silent influences by which imperfections are in process of being removed, they do not believe in them.

But by a commission, a staff of officers, and a parliamentary grant, every deficiency shall be made good, and the errors of Omniscience be rectified!" This passage is even better than the other. Why should we be deprived of so excellent an argument against physic?

But though these powerful arguments are withdrawn, Mr. Spencer is far from having weakened his faith in individualism. He even removes the small comfort formerly afforded by a little note in which he stated that his arguments against socialism do not "militate against joint-stock systems of production and living."

Another noteworthy point is the change of Mr. Spencer's attitude towards women. He carefully expunges all such statements as that "the attitudes of mastery on the one side and submission on the other are essentially at variance with that refined sentiment which should subsist between husband and wife," or the taunt that "here in England, in this nineteenth century, most women defend that state of servitude in which they are held by men." Mr. Spencer is more strict with women now.

Another omission is of a more pleasant character: "If a body of workmen formed themselves into a joint-stock manufacturing company, with elective directors, secretary, treasurer, superintendents, foremen, etc., for managing the concern, and an organization adapted to insure an equitable division of profits among the members, it was clear that the enormous sums previously pocketed by the employers would be shared amongst the employed, to the great increase of their prosperity. Yet all past attempts to act out this very plausible theory have, somehow or other, ended in miserable failures." It would seem that even the prince of Individualists can scarcely venture on this statement now.

He is as strong as of old, however, on the subject of non-compulsory education, and adds a long passage (pp. 176-184) to the former edition on this subject. He also makes a good point (p. 205) with regard to the arrangements for extinguishing fires in Berlin.

Another notable feature is the decline of Mr. Spencer's optimism since 1850. "The Evanescence of Evil" is transformed into "The Diminution of Evil." And he omits the passage in which it was maintained that "the ultimate development of the ideal man is certain,—as certain as . . . that all men will die."

It is interesting to find that Mr. Spencer still maintains his opposition to state control of coinage. He notes Jevons's criticism and endeavors to meet it, adding also the authority of Bagehot (p. 224). One would like to know more precisely what Bagehot's view was.¹

Individualism is apt to strike one as a little hard-hearted. But there is one pathetic remark in this volume. In the original edition he said that many of the poorer classes are "injured by druggists' prescriptions and quack medicines." He now inserts a note to add that "the infliction of such injuries is not peculiar to quacks. During the last four years I have had occasion to consult seven medical men, and six out of the seven did me harm!" It is high time that socialism should be abolished!

¹ It should be noted that Professor Bastable, in his article on "Money," in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," seems also to agree with Mr. Spencer on this point.

To most people, no doubt, the main interest of the present edition will consist in the light it throws on the connection between Mr. Spencer's earlier ideas and his later theory of evolution. This connection is indicated by a number of useful notes.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

CRIME AND ITS CAUSES. By William Douglas Morrison, of H. M. prison, Wandsworth. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891.

This is a work which, considering its limits and modest pretensions, it is difficult to overpraise. The writer's position as a prison chaplain has afforded him ample practical experience, while every page of the book attests his acquaintance with the scientific literature (chiefly foreign) bearing on his subject. It is a calm and thoughtful study by a writer in whom the deliberate determination to look at things as they are has not extinguished a reasoned faith in the possibility of their amelioration. The work is conceived throughout in a genuinely philosophical spirit.

The chapter-headings of the book will give some idea of its contents: "The Statistics of Crime," "Climate and Crime," "The Seasons and Crime," "Destitution and Crime," "Poverty in Crime," "Sex, Age, and Crime," "The Criminal in Body and Mind," "The Punishment of Crime."

From the point of view of psychological curiosity, the conclusion that heat, whether permanent or temporary, has some direct (as well as much indirect) influence in stimulating crime, will be found one of Mr. Morrison's most striking results. More important from a practical point of view is his disproof of the popular notions,—(1) that crime is mainly due to destitution or poverty; (2) that education is a certain cure for crime; (3) that crime is actually in course of rapid disappearance under the influence of education and other civilizing agencies. With regard to the first of these points, he shows conclusively that but a very small proportion of the world's crime is due to poverty. One of the exceptions is the existence of a small amount of vagrancy and petty theft in old men no longer able to earn the full union rate of wages; and he urges that trades-unions should relax their rules in favor of elderly or infirm members. With regard to the second, he shows that the educated classes commit fully as much crime in proportion to their numbers as any other class, putting aside the professionally criminal class, which is admittedly ignorant. (Mr. Morrison should, perhaps, have raised the question whether this class is not chiefly recruited from the most uneducated class of the community.) Under the third head, he contends that the apparent decline of crime in this country is due to (*a*) the number of juvenile offenders now confined in reformatories and industrial schools, and so temporarily incapacitated for crime, (*b*) to the tendency to pass lighter sentences. It would be absurd to put forward such facts as any refutation of a sober socialism; but they tend to disprove the optimistic theory of Mr. Belfort Bax's work in the same series, "The Ethics of Socialism," where an attempt is made to show that the "Criminal Law under Socialism" would be all but unnecessary. Still less is this practical and scientific student of crime disposed to "object to the repression of crime by organized brutality." He is "reactionary" enough to believe in the efficacy of punishment when sufficiently severe, and when supplemented by directly moral-